On the notion that the problem is how anti-racists make their arguments

protests from Memphis "I am a man"

During the Black Lives Matter protests, there were a lot of arguments about the rhetorical effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of the protests, and one recurrent argument was that the aggression and militancy of the protesters alienated potential allies. This particular argument went along these lines: “I’m not racist, and I’m very opposed to racism, but these protestors have alienated me through how they’re making their argument. If they want the support of people like me, they have to stop being so aggressive.” Let’s call the sort of person who makes this argument Chester.

[As an aside, Chester Burnette is the best dog that has ever lived, and so I always name the interlocutor Chester. Chester was male, so I’ll use “he,” but, of course, Chesters are not always male.]

I have an AB, MA, and PhD in Rhetoric. I am a professor in a Department of Rhetoric and Writing. So, I get rhetoric. I know that how you make your argument is tremendously important. My whole career has been spent trying to teach students that smacking your opposition over the head with your thesis, even if you repeat it five times, is not a great way to change anyone’s minds. What might seem compelling reasons to you won’t seem important to anyone else unless those reasons connect with a value your audience has (what, because of Aristotle, is often called “enthymematic reasoning”). So, it makes me happy that so many people expressed concern about how people argue.

Here’s what I understand Chester to believe. Chester’s opposition to racism is important to his sense of identity, and it is sincere. Some of the Chesters with whom I interacted, for instance, could talk about specific times they personally shut down someone who was racist. Still and all, it was interesting that, if the interaction went on, at some point Chester would express skepticism about whether there is really a problem of POC men (especially African– and Native-American) getting abused and even murdered by the police. Chester would almost always end up saying that there may be faults on both sides.

And he’d often appeal to his own experience to support the claim. He’s been pulled over, he’d say, sometimes for some bullshit reasons, but he kept his hands in view, answered the officer’s questions politely, and it all worked out fine. And he brings up his experience as an important piece of evidence in arguments about the police. Chester, by the way, is white. And, of course, the argument is about whether POC and especially POC men are treated badly by the police. It’s interesting that Chester doesn’t see the irrelevance of his experience.

At this moment, some Chesters will think I just made the issue about race, since I brought up Chester’s race. Some people believe that an issue is not about race until someone mentions race.

Here’s one way to think about that. We spend a lot of time at dog parks. Some people look away when their dog assumes the position, and then they try to walk away without picking it up. If I offer to pick up their dog’s shit, some people are nice about it, and some people act as though I’m the problem. I didn’t create the shit by naming it.

Does a doctor create cancer by naming it? Does a spouse only become abusive when someone calls that behavior abusive? Is a colleague’s bullying okay until the moment someone names it as bullying?

The answer, weirdly enough, for many people is yes. As long as it isn’t named, we don’t have to think about it, and we don’t have to do something about it. And so they are more angry with the person who names it than they are with the cancer, the abusive spouse, the bullying colleague.

Some Chesters were just made very uncomfortable by my using the word shit, and talking about dog shit. They think I should have found a different analogy, one that was more comfortable.

These Chesters are very nice people. Let’s call them Nice Chesters. They are people who bring you casseroles when something bad has happened, who arrange meal banks, who maintain the community garden, whose social media have lots of memes about positive thinking, who are kind to everyone. I like these people. The problem is that they want a world in which we only talk about positive things, and we don’t say anything offensive or uncomfortable (in rhetoric, we say, they are uncomfortable with violations of norms of decorum or civility).

But the dog did shit, and the person responsible for the dog shitting either picked it up or didn’t. Wanting a world in which we don’t talk about how some dog owners let their dogs shit and don’t pick it up is a world with a lot of dog shit. And if we want to solve the problem of dog shit, we have to name it. The problem doesn’t arise when we name it. That shit is there. Whether the dog owner saw it or not doesn’t matter—that shit is there. The problem gets worse when, because people don’t want to talk about shit, because it makes them uncomfortable, they don’t want to talk about people who don’t deal with their dog’s shit.

And we can only solve the problem of dog shit in dog parks (or lawns, or whatever) if we name it, and we name it as something lots of people allow to happen.

Racism is the dog shit of our world.

If we aren’t willing to have uncomfortable conversations about racism, conversations that make people as uncomfortable as my using the word shit, then we’re all looking away from the dog shit. We can’t talk about racism in our culture without being really uncomfortable.

The Nice Chesters believe that we don’t need to talk about those uncomfortable things in uncomfortable ways. They believe that, if we’re all nice to each other, everything will be fine. And that’s absolutely true. If we were all kind and loving and compassionate, then there wouldn’t be riots. There also wouldn’t be any need for riots because there wouldn’t be police officers protected from accountability. The problem is that a lot of the people who let their dogs shit and don’t pick it up aren’t nice, and there is no nice way to get that sort of person to pick it up. They just get angry.

I spent a lot of time looking at the rhetoric about slavery. Abolitionists said that slavers (many of whom liked to call themselves slaveowners or slaveholders) abused their slaves, and violated the very clear rules in Scripture about how to treat slaves. Slavers said those criticisms hurt their feelings. Many people said that the problem was that the abolitionists were too extreme in their rhetoric, and, if they were nicer, their message could get across. And so they tried to write nice criticisms of slavery—the slavers banned those writings too. It didn’t matter how nicely people said slavery was a sin; slavers didn’t want to hear it. There was no nice way.

Frederick Douglass remarked on the desire for niceness in the abolition movement—the fantasy that, if African Americans were nice enough, if abolitionists asked nicely enough, supporters of slavery would change their minds. He said, “The whole history of the progress of human liberty shows that all concessions yet made to her august claims have been born of earnest struggle. […] If there is no struggle there is no progress. Those who profess to favor freedom and yet deprecate agitation are men who want crops without plowing up the ground; they want rain without thunder and lightning. They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many waters. This struggle may be a moral one, or it may be a physical one, and it may be both moral and physical, but it must be a struggle. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will.” (“West India Emancipation“)

Right now the kind of people who would have been fighting MLK every step of the way are trying to claim that he is an example for their “if you’re nice, people will hear you” argument. That wasn’t King’s argument, he wasn’t nice, and he didn’t persuade the James Kilpatrick’s or Bull Connors of the world at all, let alone by being nice.

King’s argument was that non-violence is disruptive, controversial, and conflictual, but he also argued that what his critics thought of as “peaceful” was simply conflict of which they could be unaware. King argued that nonviolence is effective in the long run because the means and ends are aligned.

On the whole, I’m in favor of non-violent protests, partially because I’m persuaded by the research that says non-violence is more effective. But even I have to say that I don’t know of any time that non-violence worked when it came to issues of racialized police brutality. The closest I can think of is when the Nazis tried to deport Jewish men married to non-Jewish women, but it isn’t a great fit.

If there are times that non-violent protests of police brutality worked, I’d love to hear about them. It’s important to think about how changes in policing have actually been effected because, as far as I can tell, Nice Chesters are calling on protesters to engage in a kind of protest that has never worked. But what I’m certain they’re doing is shifting the conversation from the issue of racialized policing and lack of accountability to the rhetoric of protesters.

Imagine that we are room-mates, and you are angry that I never do the dishes, and you want me to do the dishes. But, every time you bring up the issue, I say that you’re criticizing me in a way that makes me uncomfortable, and so we can’t continue the conversation. I insist that I’m open to thinking about the dishes, but only if you make the argument the right way. As long as I can keep us arguing about whether you’re arguing the right way, I can keep leaving dirty dishes in the sink.

If there is no right way for you to get me to think about what I’m doing with the dishes, then I’m I’m pretending I’m open to solving the problem, but I’m not.

So, how do we know if I’m arguing in bad faith?

First, can I set standards for how you’re supposed to argue that you can actually achieve? Second, if I set the standards, do I stick to them? (That is, do I keep moving the goalposts?) Third, can I name the conditions under which I would change my mind about what I’m doing with the dishes? Fourth, am I holding us both to the same standards in regard to how we argue? (That is, am I treating us as equals–or am I allowed to argue any way I want, but you have to be careful about your tone?)

I think Chester’s argument generally violates all four rules, especially the last.

After all, what if someone said to Chester, “I’d be open to your argument that we need to make our argument differently if you made it a different way”? Would Chester feel the need to change how he is making his argument? And yet that’s just as reasonable a request as Chester’s.

When I pointed this out to Chester—that Chester is saying others need to work to persuade him, but he doesn’t need to work to persuade them—he’d say something like, “Well, if you want to win the argument, you need white people on your side.”

That just gave away the argument. Chester is saying that our culture is racist. To say that POC have to please white people rhetorically is to say that political change only happens when white people care. It’s saying that white people are in power, that white people don’t experience the police this way, that white people don’t care about the experiences of POC. And that is the BLM argument.

So, if you argue that POC who are saying that a lot of white people just aren’t willing to acknowledge the racism of our culture need to defer to the feelings of white people for anything to change, you’re proving them right.

“History is written by the winners” is exactly the wrong thing to say

Bill Barr recently said, when asked about whether history will judge him badly, “Well, history is written by the winners, so it largely depends on who’s writing the history.” A lot of people were surprised at Barr’s saying that, since it’s most famously attributed to Hermann Goering, and his lack of concern during the Nuremburg Trials. It’s often taken to mean that Goering thought there is no truth, and truth is socially constructed, so it would seem that Barr was taking that stand.

I’ve come to think that probably isn’t what Goering meant, and it probably isn’t exactly what Barr means either.

Barr was invoking a version of what, in argumentation scholarship, is called “the appeal to Galileo.” Barr was saying that he might be condemned by future historians, if his side didn’t win, just as Galileo was condemned at the time. That’s probably what Goering was saying. That doesn’t necessarily mean that he thought future historians would be defining truth. I think it’s more likely that both Barr and Goering were claiming the position of a truth-teller who, if their side lost, would be demonized.

And here I just have to pause and say that there has not been a political group as prone to whining about being victimized as the current concatenation of fanatical GOP/fundagelical/white men committed to toxic masculinity since the slavers whined that abolitionists made them feel sad.

(One thing I never got to explore in the book about proslavery rhetoric or the books on demagoguery was the role of toxic masculinity.)

Barr and Goering are (were) implicitly claiming to be Galileo, Socrates, Ignaz Semmelweis. And, in that comparison, they inadvertently showed how the comparison was wrong. Barr recognizes that the Trump Administration might (let’s be honest, will) go down in history as the most corrupt, disorganized, damaging, short-sighted, and incompetent Administration in the history of the United States.

I don’t think he’s saying that he believes he is part of such an incompetent and corrupt administration. The problem with working for a narcissist, as (oddly enough) Albert Speer observed, is that first-rate people won’t work for them, so you’re surrounded by third-raters. And third-rate thinkers like Barr are particularly prone to the Dunning-Kruger phenomenon, and over-estimate their competence and expertise. They aren’t smart enough to see that they aren’t that smart.

[As an aside, I have to say that I think it’s funny that Speer didn’t realize how his observations about the Hitler system preventing the hiring of really good people applied to him as well. But it did.]

I think Barr is saying that he believe that if he and Trump fail to create a political system in which the most anti-intellectual, authoritarian, partisan, racist, short-sighted, and greedy parts of the GOP are in control of every part of a government that operates without accountability or constraints (so much for wanting small government), then “the libs” will write histories that represent the Trump Administration badly.

This is projection.

While I think that researchers in media and political science rely on the false binary (or equally false continuum) of left (Dem) v. right (GOP) means that they misrepresent our ideological map, it’s very clear that “both sides” do not engage in misrepresentation of the other side to equal degrees. People and media who self-identify as conservative are more likely to promote lies, fail to check sources, engage in motivism, and privilege loyalty to group over any other values. When presented with that research, an awful lot of people who self-identify as conservative say the research must be biased because it doesn’t show both sides are equally bad.

They don’t realize that, by having that reaction, they’ve confirmed the research.

Were the research better, I think, it would show that not all people who self-identify as conservative are irrationally factional, that there are places all over the political spectrum (not continuum) where people are equally unwilling to believe that there might be intelligent and good-willed disagreement. If we could have research grounded in that understanding of political affiliation as a spectrum rather than a binary, then we could have a good discussion about how people think about politics that doesn’t reproduce our demagogic culture (in which every issue is reduced to which group is better).

But, back to Barr. Barr is more concerned about his side winning than about having a justice system that is blind to identity (the whole point of Justice’s blindfolds is that she doesn’t know who she’s judging—it’s the original position). Barr doesn’t want a system in which all people are treated the same; he’s rabidly and irrationally partisan. If he succeeds, then he’ll make sure that all histories treat him and Trump as heroes. He is the one who will write history to celebrate the winners.

But that isn’t how “winning” history works. Galileo’s persecution was much more complicated than people think, and the main problem was that his argument for heliocentrism was more accessible than others. Socrates was ordered to drink hemlock, not because the Athenians wanted to silence someone who spoke the truth, but because many (not all) Athenians believed him to be involved with the Thirty Tyrants. What made him a martyr wasn’t that he pissed everyone off with the questions he asked, but his refusal to escape the death sentence—his insistence that the law applies to everyone (which is pretty nearly the opposite of what Barr has argued, since he has argued that Trump is above accountability or any laws). The other case that gets invoked in the “I am speaking the truth but They will silence me” is Semmelweis. But Semmelweis also doesn’t show that the winners write the history. Semmelweis lost in his lifetime. And we know about him because people reconsidered.

For a hundred years, the slaver version of the Civil War was the dominant narrative. It lost the war, and won the history. Now it’s losing the history.

The most uncharitable version of what Barr said is that he is an amoral social constructivist of the worst kind, Machiavellian to the core. In my experience, that kind of person is rare. Machiavellians do claim foundational truths–they end up insisting that Machiavellianism is true.

More common is the sociopathic Machiavellian who is incapable of perspective-shifting; they just don’t think there are other perspectives. [Every once in a while, I run across people, all over the political spectrum, who think perspective shifting is bad—that’s a different post.] I think Barr is in that category of not really understanding that, not only are there other points of view, but that they might be right.

The charitable reading of Barr is that he believes that he is a victim (that is, criticized) for speaking the truth, but, he thinks, if he fails in his endeavor to substitute a one-party state for a democracy, then his opponents will treat him as he has been treating them.

[That’s another post—people who feel justified in oppressing the other side because, if the other side got into power, they would do the same –but it’s logically, empirically, and ethically indefensible. It’s never been associated with sensible policies.]

What Barr said is open, I think, to two interpretations, and neither of them makes him look like an ethical or reflective person. One is that he’s the worst kind of power politics shoddy-Nietzschean epistemological constructivist—might not only makes right, but it makes truth.

The second is that he feels a victim because he thinks he’s Galileo. But he isn’t. Galileo had a lot of evidence for his arguments, as even his opponents acknowledged he did, and Barr knows about Galileo because history isn’t written by the winners in power politics.

In other words, Barr’s saying “History is written by the winners” (most famously attributed to Goering) shows why he’s really not someone who should be head of the DOJ. Either he’s someone who thinks the Nazis were right in their power politics, or he’s someone who hasn’t really thought about his own argument.

He might be both.

Invitation to the Bores (Hitler’s “Table Talk”–RSA talk)

Hitler looking at a map with generals

To the extent that scholars in rhetoric are interested in Hitler (and that isn’t much) the attention is paid to his big rallies and major speeches, but, for purposes of thinking about our current problems with political deliberation, his smaller rhetorical situations are more instructive, specifically, his deliberations with his immediate circle.

The very effective Nazi propaganda machine promoted the “Hitler Myth:” that he (and he alone) had the sincerity, will, stamina, and judgment to lead Germany to the greatness it once had and was entitled to have again (Kershaw, Hitler Myth). His superior judgment enabled him to have brilliant insights—better than supposed “experts”—on topics ranging from interior design to economics. He was particularly prone to showing off this “universal genius” at meals, during which he delivered monologues for the benefit of his inner circle, his most devoted followers—the people most deeply committed to him, and most committed to promoting the myth of him as a universal genius. The paradox I want to pursue in this talk is that those were the people who, because of so much exposure to his opinions and processes of judgment, must have known that he wasn’t a universal genius at all. Yet, they seem to have believed and not believed in his perfect judgment.

Albert Speer, who maintained in his mendacious post-war writings that he avoided the mealtime monologues, describes an illustrative moment, when Hitler lied to his dining companions about having chosen all the marble personally for various buildings. Speer comments:”Hadn’t he noticed that I was sitting at an adjoining table? What so took me aback was and is the fact that he was still clutching at glory in such ridiculously trivial questions” (Spandau 118).

Speer says, “How intense and uncontrollable this man’s desire to show off must have been!” (Spandau 119). It wasn’t just Speer who must have noticed that quality. He mentions that “Hitler quite often presented as the fruit of his own reflections” information that Speer knew had been given him by other experts, and that all of the inner circle knew that Hitler lied when he claimed to read all of a treatise, since he also bragged about only reading the ends of books.

Speer, describing an evening that devolved into Hitler’s “lengthy expatiations on the role of the individual in history” (Spandau 58), says that Hitler’s “relationship to history was sheer romanticism and centered around the concept of the hero. He might well mention Napoleon or Old Shatterhand in one sentence” (Spandau 59). ‘Old Shatterhand’ was the hero of the German author Karl May’s Western novels, which Hitler loved, and which informed Hitler’s understanding of American history and culture (although May hadn’t been to the US prior to writing most of the Shatterhand series). Speer says that “Hitler would rely on Karl May as proof for everything imaginable” including what constitutes the ideal company commander (in the form of May’s fictional Winnetou, Spandau 347; see also Kershaw, Hitler 7, Hubris 15, ). Someone whose assessment of a major foe is grounded in popular novels is hardly a genius, let alone a universal one.

Many of Hitler’s lunch and dinner monologues were later published as a book called Hitler’s Table Talk (an obvious reference to The Table Talk of Martin Luther), or, more accurately, some version of those monologues was. The history of their publication is fraught, and there are reasons to doubt many of the passages (especially regarding religion). There is also reason to think that the published version is more coherent than what listening to them was actually like. Speer says of the published version that it “more or less filtered [Hitler’s] torrent of speech and subsequently smoothed and styled it” (Spandau 345). The book, Speer says, reduced Hitler’s repetition, “the slow, painful process of gestation which could be felt in the way phrases were formed [….] Vivid monologues have been produced out of agonizing long-windedness” (Spandau 346). It’s hard to imagine that the actual talk would have been even more long-winded and incoherent, since reading Hitler’s Table Talk is like reading the transcript of what a narcissistic sophomore in college who thinks he has smoked good weed would say to a room of people who have passed out long ago or are already getting at it on the bunk bed above. It’s hard to read them and not come to the conclusion that Hitler is a bloviating, self-deluded, thin-skinned blowhard.

It’s equally hard to believe that the people at the tables with him didn’t come to that conclusion as well.

There are similar problems with the transcripts of Hitler’s meetings with his generals (Hitler and His Generals). While the post-war narrative promoted by many of Hitler’s generals (that he continually got in their way, that they could have won the war if left to make their own decisions, that they didn’t know about the serial genocides, and that they continually resisted him, and so on) was simply untrue, the deliberations do show a leader not very good at deliberating. Like the meal-time monologues, they have passages of Hitler browbeating, rambling, and being more concerned with being right than with finding the right course of action. As his generals are pressuring him to make a decision, he might suddenly veer off into a windy digression about medals, the racial characteristics of troops, how right he was in some previous disagreement with generals, why his experience as a private means he understands strategy better than any general.

My point is that the people exposed to this blathering and bullshitting would have known Hitler was not a stable genius with universally valid insight. Yet they were the ones who most enabled him and enabled the Hitler myth. Why support him, why support the lie that Germans should trust him? What persuaded them to support him publicly? And the answer is: the way that the power relations inherent to charismatic leadership can inhibit not only deliberation, but doubt of any kind.

Charismatic authority is most famously described by Max Weber, who described it as one of three ways that a ruler can be perceived as legitimate. Charismatic authority comes from the beliefs of the followers, “how followers see things” (Economy and Society page 374). In the relationship of charismatic authority, “supernatural, superhuman, or at least exceptional powers or properties are attributed to the individual” (374). Ian Kershaw summarizes how charismatic authority relies on continually good outcomes for the followers: the power of the charismatic leader is “sustained by great deeds, resounding successes, and notable achievements, which provide the repeated ‘proof’ of the leader’s ‘calling’” (Hitler Myth 9). The charismatic leader must continually surprise his followers with his “universal genius”—that’s why Hitler would grasp at petty successes (like claiming to have picked the marble personally), and refuse to admit errors.

The question is why those obvious moves would work.

And they would work partially because they had to work. The power of the charismatic leader comes from self-confidence, which is necessary for the risk-taking. Thus, the dynamic of charismatic—the need for fawning followers, the need to impress those followers, the need for self-confidence—mean that the charismatic leader him (or her) self has to be the first and most fooled about their own supernatural abilities. And, it’s hard to maintain that level of self-delusion if the people immediately surrounding the leader are even dubious, let alone critical, of the leader. Thus, dissent is treated as disloyalty, and the consequence is that the leader has to be surrounded by people who are, or who believe themselves to be, not as insightful and charismatic.

Oddly enough, it was Speer (who was not and never had been as good at his job as his post-war autohagiographies would claim) who identified the problem with Hitler’s regime: that it put and kept in place people who were weak, corrupt, and just not very good (“inferior” is the term Speer used). Hitler’s “joy” at hearing “news which suited his course of action” and “anger at news which crossed him” (Overy Interrogations 226) meant that people didn’t give him the information, insights, and suggestions that would have led to better decisions (an important theme in Kershaw’s Fateful Choices). Hitler’s emphasis on loyalty, his need to be a universal genius, his faith in himself—all those characteristics meant that he didn’t want people around him who were smarter than he, better informed, or threatening to his ego in any way. As Speer said, Hitler’s “methods of necessity led to weak collaborators for his arbitrary method of choice brought no men with proper qualifications to the right positions” and the “inferiority” of his subordinates ensured that their subordinates would also be “inferior” (Overy 226). Speer draws the conclusion that “A system which makes the selection of the leading personalities dependent solely on the judgment, arbitrary discretion, and whims of the dictators inevitably leads to such results” (Overy 226). And that is the kind of system encouraged by the model of charismatic leadership.

Charismatic leadership, despite serious problems, remains the dominant model of leadership, especially in the popular culture of self-help books and management seminars. Americans’ persistent fascination with charismatic leadership is important for scholars of rhetoric because charismatic leadership is a theory of rhetoric and deliberation. Or, more accurately, it’s a theory of rhetoric that is anti-deliberation. The fantasy of charismatic leadership is that there are people whose ability to lead (that is, both make decisions and motivate others to go along with those decisions [deliberate and persuade]) is not discipline- or field-specific. It’s universal. People with field- or discipline-specific expertise inform these leaders who are then able to discern the correct course of action because they have a kind of judgment—extraordinary insight, vision, they’re great judges of people—that makes their assessment better than anyone else’s. This is an incipiently authoritarian model of power, in that power comes from the supposedly superior judgment of the leader. For a leader to admit error, uncertainty, or ignorance, then, is to reduce their power. Dissent, disagreement, and deliberation have problematic places in systems reliant on charismatic leadership, especially the more that the leader believes in their own charismatic leadership—they come to believe the myths about themselves (see especially Kershaw Hitler Myth 264)

Scholars in leadership have tried to manage the problem of leaders who lead organizations, corporations, and countries right off a cliff (sometimes called “the Hitler Problem,” Tourish and Pinnington 149). by distinguishing between good and bad charismatic leadership on the grounds of outcome and/or the leader’s intention. Both criteria lead one into the ‘no true Scotsman’ fallacy and survivorship bias.

If good charismatic leaders are ones that get good outcomes, then Hitler was a good leader until, at the earliest December of 1941; some Germans began to lose faith in November of 1943, with the encirclement at Stalingrad; and US intelligence reports said that 25% of Germans still believed in Hitler in 1945, as Allied troops were crashing into Germany (Kershaw The End, Gellately Backing Hitler, Evans The Third Reich at War). There is the same problem with assessing leaders of corporations in terms of outcomes–what if they are getting good outcomes through processes that guarantee eventual disaster? Ken Lay of Enron, Eckhard Pfeiffer of Compaq, Adam Neumann of WeWork, Elizabeth Holmes of Theranos, Travis Kalanick of Uber—they were all celebrated as excellent examples of transformational leaders until the moment they weren’t. Until news broke about fraud, dodgy accounting, misleading claims, cultures of bullying and harassment, they were, after all, getting good outcomes–being lauded in the press, successful at finding backers, and effectively silencing dissenters (through intimidation, NDA, nuisance suits). Their methods of leading didn’t change; the outcomes did because the methods became public.

In effect, then, “good” charismatic leadership isn’t really a different management style from “bad” charismatic leadership as long as we measure by outcomes. It’s just leadership with accurate press.

There’s a similar problem with trying to distinguish good from bad charismatic leadership on the grounds of intent—if there is one thing about which people who met Hitler agreed, it was that he sincerely believed that what he was doing was right. Intending to do good, and doing good aren’t the same thing, and believing that one is on the side of good can contribute to exploitative and dishonest practices. The problem with much scholarship on charismatic leadership is that there is a “no true Scotsman” quality about it (leaders who are exposed as exploitative were never really charismatic leaders) as well as survivorship bias (only looking at leaders who seem to be getting good outcomes).

So, why am I talking to scholars of rhetoric about a leadership model backed by scholarship that is largely “no true Scotsman” and survivorship bias? Because, the rhetoric and ideology of charismatic leadership is probably second only to the just world model (in its most powerful form—prosperity gospel) in terms of frames from within which Americans imagine the possibilities, responsibilities, and stases of political discourse. Scholars who care about rhetoric as a critical project, as something that could help people deliberate better, need to understand the extent to which the rhetoric about charismatic leadership pathologizes (and sometimes feminizes) what scholars of deliberation promote as useful and effective deliberation.

Hitler’s rhetoric worked because the people in his inner circle made sure it worked, because he had a wickedly effective propaganda machine that continually presented him as someone who, as Rush Limbaugh said about Trump, “has excellent instincts,” despite all the evidence to the contrary. A large number of Americans think deliberation is unnecessary because the correct course of action (which just happens to benefit them or fulfill their political agenda) is obvious, and anyone who disagrees with them is villainous or the dupe of villainous entities (a way of thinking about politics not restricted to one position). A concerningly large number of Americans believe that the right course of action is to put in positions of power decisive people who get the real people, will refuse to compromise, and are willing to violate any norms of discourse, fairness, process, accountability, precedence, even legality in order to enact the policy every reasonable person knows is right. We are in a world in which “disruptive” is an end in and of itself.

In other words, a large number of people, all over the political spectrum, don’t want a democracy because they don’t want inclusive deliberation, compromise, negotiation, and accountability. They want their way, and they want violence if they can’t get it. Rhetoric is, at its best, the discipline of democratizing deliberation, the alternative to violence. The rhetoric of charismatic leadership is anti-deliberation; its cultural dominance explains a lot, I’m arguing, about our current culture of demagoguery. American worshipping (and I use that word deliberately) of charismatic leadership explains many otherwise odd things about our current political situation.

Speer’s insight was that charismatic leadership is always at least a little at odds with an administration of hiring the best people. The more that we value charismatic leadership as the best kind of leadership, the more that we sideline inclusive deliberation and accountability as political goods.

Passages from Ian Kershaw’s “The Hitler Myth”

Hitler building a road

“The extensified fragmentation of Weimar politics and eventual decline into little more than interest politics in the face of mounting internal crisis, entirely delegitimized the State system itself, wholly discredited pluralist politics, and paved the way for a full acceptance–already by 1932 of around 13 million Germans–of a new basis of unity represented in an entirely novel political form personalized in Hitler’s ‘charismatic’ leadership.

” In such conditions as prevailed in the last phase of the Weimar Republic, of the total discrediting of a State system based upon pluralist politics, the ‘functional’ leadership of the bureaucrat and the Party political politician as the representative of the ‘rational-legal’ form of political domination, imposing laws and carrying out functions for which they are not personally responsible and with which they are not identifiable, lost credibility. Salvation could only be sought with a leader who possessed personal power and was prepared to take personal responsibility, sweeping away the causes of misery and the faceless politicians and bureaucrats who prevail over it, and seeming to impose his own personal power upon the force of history itself [….] (255)

Hitler’s “well-documented fear of personal popularity and the corresponding growth in instability of the regime is further testimony of his awareness of the centrality of his integrative force of his role as Fuhrer. This integration was largely affective, for the most part forging psychological or emotional rather than material bonds. But its reality can scarcely be doubted.” (The Hitler Myth 257)

People really need to understand syllogisms

Photo of Americans being sent to concentration camps
https://anchoreditions.com/blog/dorothea-lange-censored-photographs

People reason syllogistically, and yet nowhere in a college or high school curriculum are people taught to recognize a syllogism, let alone when it’s gerfucked.

A syllogism is a way of reasoning: if A = B, and C = B, then C = A.

If all dogs are mammals, and Chester is a dog, then Chester is a mammal.

If all dogs [A] are [=] mammals [B], and Chester [C] is [=] a dog [A], then Chester [C] is a mammal [B]. So, if A = B, and C=A, then C= B.

As Aristotle pointed out, we don’t usually show our work. We are reasoning syllogistically, but our rhetoric is an enthymeme. We say, “Of course Chester is a mammal; he’s a dog.”

An enthymeme is a compressed syllogism. Instead of saying: A = B; C= A; therefore C = B (which, if all those things are really equally, must be true), people say C = B because C = A, assuming that you believe that A =B.

That seems weird and alien, but here are examples of times that people use enthymemes:
• “She’s in favor of reducing immigration, so she must be racist.”
• “She’s in favor of state-supported medical care, so she must be a socialist.”
• “She drives a Prius, so she must support Biden.”
• “That dog is a pitbull, so it must be dangerous.”
• “Trump supports Hydroxychloroquine, so it must be good.”
• “Trump supports Hydroxychloroquine, so it must be bad.”

Those are all enthymemes. If you rewrite them as syllogisms, you can see that the reasoning in every one is bad.

• “She’s in favor of reducing immigration, so she must be racist.”
That has the form of major premise: A (anyone in favor of reducing immigration) = (is) B (racist).
The minor premise is: C (she) = (is) A (in favor of reducing immigration).
The conclusion is: C (she) = (is) B (racist).

Or, to take it out of the letters, here’s the syllogism.
Major premise: Anyone in favor of reducing immigration is racist.
Minor premise: She is in favor of reducing immigration.
Conclusion: Therefore, she is racist.

• “She’s in favor of state-supported medical care, so she must be a socialist.”

Major premise: Anyone in favor of state-supported medical care is a socialist.
Minor premise: She is in favor of state-supported medical care.
Conclusion: She is a socialist.

• “She drives a Prius, so she must support Biden.”

Major premise: Anyone who drives a Prius must support Biden.
Minor premise: She drives a Prius.
Conclusion: She supports Biden.

I won’t do the others, since you get the point. The major premises are wrong.

Reducing immigration doesn’t necessarily mean someone is racist; Eisenhower was in favor of state-supported medical care; lots of people who drive Priuses don’t support Biden; not all pitbulls are dangerous; not everything Trump recommends is good; not everything he recommends is bad.

One of the reasons that scholars of logic kicked syllogistic reasoning to the curb is that it is not actually logical. The major premises tend to be stereotypes.

But, it is how we reason. That person is good because she was nice to me. I don’t want to sit next to that person on the bus because they seem sketchy. That person is smart because she agrees with me. That person has good judgment because she said I’m really smart.

There’s nothing wrong with reasoning through enthymemes, as long as we’re aware of our major premises, and willing to think about them critically. Most of us aren’t.

Take, for instance, the enthymeme: “Americans of Japanese ethnicity are dangerous because Japan attacked us.” If you break that out into a syllogism, you get:

These people (Americans of Japanese ethnicity) [ A] are dangerous [B] because Japan [C] attacked us [B].

That’s a bad syllogism.