One of many weird things about politics is how people claim that their opposition to a political figure is a question of principle, but that principle only seems to apply to an out-group politician. Thus, if Chester embezzles, and you are anti-Chesterian, you are likely to try to make your position seem reasonable—and not just in-group fanaticism—by claiming that you’re opposed to dodgy real estate dealing on principle.
But, if Hubert, your candidate, is later caught in dodgy real estate dealing, you’re suddenly going to find a reason your “principled” opposition to dodgy real estate dealing doesn’t apply. There are, loosely, three ways you’ll do that without believing that you have thereby violated your principle.
- By not hearing about it, or dismissing any reports of it as “biased.” You simply refuse to listen to anyone who says that Hubert engaged in dodgy real estate dealing.
- By claiming that it wasn’t really in dodgy real estate dealing because Hubert had different motives (we attribute good motives to in-group members and bad motives to out-group members) or because there were extenuating circumstances. That is, we explain bad behavior on the part of in-group members externally (circumstances), but bad behavior on the part of out-group members as internally (as a deliberate choice showing their essential evil).
- By saying that the in-group situation is so desperate that any behavior on our part is justified (note that this is saying that the stance on dodgy real estate dealing is, therefore, a principle for which there are lots of exceptions—you would operate on the basis of this principle were it not for the out-group).
[There is also the thoroughly unprincipled, openly irrational, and anti-democratic response that anything your group does is okay because the out-group has done a bad thing too. This post isn’t about that response—this is about people who think they’re principled and not fanatical about their in-group.]
In my experience arguing with people, they will also not uncommonly just refuse to admit that they ever claimed that their stance on in dodgy real estate dealing was principled (although they once did). They just don’t care if Hubert had and has dodgy real estate dealings—they admire it; they see it as a sign of his being a person with good judgment. Yet they remain in a white-hot rage about Chester’s dodgy real estate dealing, and they’ll suddenly rediscover they’re principled opposition.
This is just factionalism, but what I find interesting is that people who are clearly engaged in factionalism keep trying to claim they aren’t. (Some people admit that their support for one candidate or another is factionalism—this isn’t about them.)
In addition to number two (above)—you can always find ways to rationalize in-group behavior—there’s something else. It’s about identification.
Kenneth Burke long ago (1939, in a way) figured out that a really persuasive political figure presents zirself [I loathe him/her] as the same kind of person as the “real” people in a community. Many people decide whether to support a political figure on the basis of in-group membership—that person is me; that person gets me; that person cares about me. They see that person as someone they could be.
So, if I think Hubert is basically me with different opportunities, I will take every criticism of him as personally as I take criticisms of me, I will judge and explain his actions the same way I judge and explain mine. And most of us are pretty forgiving of ourselves. All of spend a lot of time finding reasons to justify behavior that violates principles we claim to hold.
Hillary Clinton and Trump both have/had accusations of dodgy real estate deals.
Assume, for the sake of argument, that HRC and Trump have equally plausible accusations of equally serious dodgy real estate deals.
If you liked HRC, if you see her as someone like you, if you think she has had a life you could have, or if you think she is the sort of person you want to be, if you admire a person with her education and intellectual achievements and abilities, if you imagine that you and she could be friends, then you wouldn’t mind accusations against her because you would find ways to explain them. You would find yourself imagining how you could have gotten into that situation, and why it wouldn’t really matter. You might even admire her for having bent the rules because you’d like to do that.
If you see her as a kind of person you don’t like, if you feel that what she is done is something you never could do, if you see her as someone you would never want to be (or you believe the rhetoric that people like her look down on people like you), then she is that bitch over there eating crackers.
If you liked Trump, if you see him as someone like you, if you think he has had a life you could have, or if you think he is the sort of person you want to be, if you imagine that you and he could be friends, if you think he really gets you and looks about for people like you, if you think that he responds to situations the way you would, then you wouldn’t mind accusations against him because you would find ways to explain them. You would find yourself imagining how you could have gotten into that situation, and why it wouldn’t really matter. You might even admit he bent the rules and admire him for it.
If you see Trump as a kind of person you don’t like, if you think he behaves in a way you never would, if you believe the rhetoric about the gold toilet, then he is that jerk to whom rules don’t apply.
So, am I saying “both sides are just as bad”? Nope, because I don’t think American politics is accurately described as “two sides.”
The important point is that neither of these responses is principled. They’re factional.
A person for whom dodgy real estate deals is a reason to reject a candidate, on principle, would investigate the claims by reading the smartest versions of the accusations against both, regardless of in- or out-group source. If that isn’t what you do, then this isn’t really about the principle of dodgy real estate deals—it’s about dodgy real estate deals being a brick you can throw at the other side. Your political positions are the consequence of irrational commitments to your in-group.