Be nicer to Hitler, and he’ll stop being Hitler: The Marquess of Londonderry’s Ourselves and Germany (1938)

In March of 1938, The Marquess of Londonderry published an argument that Britain had failed to respond to Germany’s often (and still) outstretched hand for peace, that Germany wanted nothing but that to which it was due, and that Hitler was a leader with reasonable goals that could be met (although Londonberry also mentions that he frequently asked German leaders to list their policy goals explicitly and clearly, and it never happened). Londonderry’s argument was that British foreign policy had caused Germans to be extremist because the British hadn’t been accommodating enough to the Germans who only wanted [keep in mind he’d never gotten German leaders to say what they wanted].

Londonderry published two versions of this book. One after the “Anschluss,” when Hitler forcibly annexed Austria (something Londonderry blames on Kurt von Schuschnigg, basically for resisting). While the annexation appears to have been popular in both Germany and Austria, the celebration consisted of extraordinary brutality toward the Jews. That violence was very public.

March 1938 was also long after the Nuremburg Laws (1935), after Hitler’s violations of various treaties and agreements and his going back on multiple promises, and over ten years after he published Mein Kampf, which clearly lays out his eliminationist, militaristic, and hegemonic goals. That agreement is generally considered a disaster, that emboldened Hitler, betrayed Czechoslavkia, and cemented his popularity with Germans.

Penguin published the book in October of 1938, with a new preface. On September 30, 1938, Chamberlain had signed the “Munich Agreement,” which gave Hitler a large chunk of Czechoslovakia because Hitler promised, for realz this time, that he wouldn’t try to get any more territory and wanted peace.

Londonderry says, in that preface to the October 1938 edition, that the disastrous Czechoslovakia agreement represented “the fulfillment of my hopes,” that “the international barometer […] is at ‘Set Fair’,” and “ I can only have a feeling of great happiness at this moment that all I have advocated has been brought about in a moment of time” (xi, xiii). He believed that the events of September proved he had been right all along. He had the outcome he had long wanted, the outcome he thought was success, and so he concluded the process—relentless appeasement on the part of Britain—was a good one.

Londonderry is a great example as to why what might be called “folk pragmatism” (“the proof is in the pudding”) is a disastrous way to think about policy deliberation.

Londonderry’s argument was that the Versailles Treaty dishonored Germany (he wasn’t making an economic argument), and denied Germany the right to be treated as an equal in regard to decisions about Europe. (t’s interesting to think about why Londonderry assumed that Germany was entitled to be treated as an equal to France and Britain.) There are, and have long been, lots of arguments as to why WWI (aka, “The Great War”) happened, and the scholarly consensus is that it wasn’t mono-causal, but the consensus is also that Germany bore a large portion of the responsibility. There is also a consensus that the conditions imposed on Germany were no worse than what Germany had imposed on Russia, in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty,  or on France, after the Franco-Prussian War.

Londonderry wasn’t the only major British political figure who supported the policy of appeasement, and the British policy of appeasement was supported for very complicated reasons (best explained by Benny Morris, Abraham Ascher, Tim Bouverie, and Ian Kershaw). But Londonderry’s argument wasn’t particularly complicated: Londonderry accepts the Nazi victim narrative that Germany being treated as it had treated France is so dishonoring of Germany that its putting Hitler in power is the fault of the British. Londonderry argues that Nazis want to be the friend of Britain. Nazi Germany can be an ally, and that we need to stop engaging in rhetoric that alienates them. Londonderry’s argument is, at its heart, an argument about feelings: the Versailles Treaty made Germans feel bad; Hitler is acting the way he is because he feels bad; if we make him and Germans feel better, they’ll have different policies. We can changes their policies by changing their feelings.

Londonderry postures himself as a reasonable person willing to look at both sides, but notice that France’s position is not one of the “sides” that needs understanding. He doesn’t need to understand the feelings of the French or the people opposed to his policies.

In fact, he argues that Germany and Britain have far more in common than Britain and France because “There are many points of similarities between our two countries [Britain and Germany], and there is a racial connection which in itself establishes a primary friendly feeling between us which cannot be said to exist between us and the French” (19).

Not only is that statement racist, but it’s typical of how incoherent racism is. “Racial” categories are always just politically useful ways of grouping people that racists want to believe are real. Madison Grant—the man who wrote “Hitler’s Bible,” whose arguments about race meant we sent away boats of Jews trying to escape Nazi Germany, and who was still being cited as an expert in the 1960s–was very clear that “race mixing” was bad, by which he meant a “Nordic” and a “Mediterranean.” For Grant, and people like him, Italians, Poles, Czechs, Romanians weren’t really white, so a Pole marrying a Brit would lead to the downfall of civilization just as much as a Brit and an African. I mention this just because I routinely run across people with Polish, Ukrainian, Greek, or Italian last names who claim praise Grant as a credible source.

White supremacists aren’t very good at reading comprehension.

But, back to Londonderry. He has two points to his argument. First, the current problems between Britain and Germany, he says, can “only” be solved “by a sympathetic understanding” of the German position.

As far as the first, Londonderry’s book makes clear something I’m not sure he himself saw—he repeatedly asked Nazis to say exactly what they wanted, and they never did. Yet, he insisted that Germany had continually extended the hand of friendship to Britain, and it had been rejected. In other words, Londonderry thought the world of politics was one in which people need to feel good about each other, and feel respected by one another. And that was his mistake. He thought the problem with Germany was not that its culture had a victim narrative of being entitled and encircled, that powerful political groups (including the Catholic party, communists, monarchists, fascists, and nationalists) wanted to make sure that democracy failed, but that Germans felt bad, and therefore they advocated aggression. If we treated them more honorably, they wouldn’t feel bad, and so they wouldn’t be so aggressive.

I’m all for understanding exactly what the other sides are saying. I believe to my core that effective deliberation—political, personal, professional—requires that people really understand the arguments that other people are making. Understanding those arguments doesn’t necessarily mean that you think they have any legitimacy; understanding how a bad argument works is like understanding how a bridge collapsed. But that isn’t what Londonderry means.

And it’s interesting to think about just what arguments he argued needed understanding. Hitler’s arguments about honor needed understanding. Arguments about Nazi genocidal policies didn’t. Londonderry exemplifies one way that people argue for a dodgy in-group policies. Londonderry argued for “fairness” regarding Nazis because he didn’t really have any problem with their political agenda, as far as he understood it.

He includes in his book, after a long description of how charming his 1936 visit to Germany was, a letter to Ribbentrop he wrote February 21, 1936. In that letter he says,

“As I told you, I have no great affection for the Jews. It is possible to trace their participation in most of those international disturbances which have created so much havoc in different countries, but on the other hand one can find many Jews strongly ranged on the other side who have done their best with the wealth at their disposal, and also by their influence, to counteract those malevolent and mischievous activities of fellow Jews” (97)

This is a perfect example of someone making what appears to a gesture of fairness, but is actually just a tone of fairness, all the while endorsing Nazis. Fairness shouldn’t be a tone, but an ethic.

There are people (and I try to be one of them) who can say, “I disagree completely with this argument, but it is a valid argument.” This is kind of old-school logic: being true and being valid aren’t the same. That appeal to fairness is wildly different from what Londonderry is here doing. He is engaged in the kind of bothsidesism that nurtures genocide. He is saying that, on the whole, the logic of the Nazis genocidal policy is legit, but don’t go overboard.

Londonderry argued for listening to Nazis, not because he was, in principle, committed to listening to all groups, let alone holding all groups to the same ethical or rhetorical standards—he didn’t try to be fair to the French, let alone to Churchill. He didn’t argue for listening to Nazis in order to understand how to argue against them. He argued for sympathizing with Nazis because he didn’t really have a problem with their wanting a country free of Jews.

As it turns out, being nice to Hitler didn’t change Hitler’s policies. It rarely does. Hitler’s rhetoric (public and interpersonal) was all about feelings; he was all about making “Germans” (his supporters) feel that he was looking out for them, and he enacted policies that got his supporters short-term benefits. He was like a con artist who seduces someone by wining and dining them, all the time on the credit cards he’s stolen from the mark. What mattered about Hitler wasn’t how he felt about Germany, whether he made people feel proud to be Germans, or even, really, how he felt about Jews or Poles or Sinti or Slavs—what mattered is that his policies ensured that Germany would find itself in a two-front war, a kind of war it couldn’t win, unsustainable economic policies, serial genocides. As they say, fuck Hitler’s feelings.

When someone says we should be nicer to Nazis as though that will persuade Nazis to be less Nazi, they’re saying they don’t really have a big problem with Nazi policies. What’s wrong with Nazis isn’t how Nazis feel; it’s the policies they support. We should stop arguing about Nazis’ feelings, and just oppose policies that help Nazis. Fuck their feelings.

Freedom, tolerance, and fairness

Image from here.

The political theorist Isaiah Berlin famously identified two very different ways that people talk about freedom: for some people, “freedom” is the freedom from being told what to do; for others, “freedom” is the freedom to do things. Thus, for example, joining a union restricts your freedom from rules (you have to pay dues and go on strike if the union says) but increases your freedom to get better wages and working conditions.  

For a long time, I thought Berlin was right, and I used his categories. But, having spent an equally long time (perhaps too long) crawling around the digital world arguing with assholes, I don’t think his division is right. I think, actually, that everyone uses the term “freedom” to mean the same thing.

Cicero, the brilliant Roman orator, said that if you have a controversial thesis, you should delay it, and so I will.

Let’s start with an old argument: from about 1644 to 1652, John Cotton (a 17th century Massachusetts Bay Colony minister) and Roger Williams (generally considered the founder of the Baptist Church) got into a nasty and wordy argument about many things, but especially whether Williams’ eviction from the Massachusetts Bay Colony was just.

I happen to have read the whole long exchange, and what struck me as interesting is that they agreed on the stasis.

In rhetoric, it’s generally agreed that a good disagreement has people agreed on the stasis—the hinge of the argument. A good door has a hinge that connects it to the wall. If there is no hinge, then either there is no door, or the door just falls in. Most really bad disagreements are the consequence of not agreeing on the stasis. If you snoop and find that your partner is cheating on you, you will want the stasis to be their infidelity, but they will want the stasis to be which of you is the better person, and, they will then try to make the issue your snooping. (In rhetoric, this is called deflection.)

But Williams and Cotton agreed on the stasis: they agreed that a good government allows freedom of conscience. Williams argued that his freedom of conscience had been violated because he hadn’t been allowed to have the religious beliefs and practice his conscience told him were right.  

Cotton agreed that “freedom of conscience” meant the freedom to do what your conscience told you was right, but, he insisted that Williams must have violated his conscience since he did something that Cotton thought was wrong. In other words, as Cotton said, “freedom of conscience” is the right to do what’s right. By that, he meant the freedom to do what he thought was right. Cotton believed that every action is either right or wrong, and that the right course of action and the right set of beliefs (his) is obvious to everyone. Thus, he said, Williams wasn’t just wrong, but knew he was wrong—there is, Cotton said (and sincerely believed) no real disagreement on issues of religion. This is one instance of what is called naïve realism.

Naïve realism is the belief that the truth is obvious to everyone of good will, that if you want to know if something is true, you just ask yourself if you’re really perceiving things correctly. It’s the notion that perception is accurate, and that bad judgment happens because you then deliberately distort those perceptions to justify actions you kind of always know are wrong, or because you’re blinded by your commitment to a group. This is all false. That isn’t how perception works at all, but let’s leave that aside and go back to Cotton and Williams.

Cotton’s notion about how people perceive things—that everyone really has the same beliefs  he does, but they deny them, that he is the person whose beliefs are entirely right (his epistemology)—was what made his political stance (banishing Williams) seem not just reasonable, but a way of honoring the principle of freedom of conscience. Cotton believed everyone should be free to be just like him, and he should be free to force them to do so.

Cotton said that freedom of conscience meant the freedom to do what your conscience told you to do. And he sincerely believed that your conscience told you that you should do what he thought you should do. Because, of course, he sincerely believed he was right, and he couldn’t imagine that, given how certain he was about his being right, that anyone really believed anything different, let alone that he might be wrong. Cotton confused that sense of certainty with an unmediated perception of reality. A lot of people do. The problem with Cotton wasn’t what he believed, but what he believed about his beliefs.

That’s a weird sentence, but it’s everything about democracy. Democracy thrives not when people believe the same things, but when we know other people really believe other things, and we want them treated as we would like to be treated. Cotton didn’t really think anyone disagreed with him. Cotton believed that freedom meant the freedom for him to force others to do what he thought was right because he believed everyone really knew he was right. Our problem now is that our political world is filled with John Cottons.

Williams recognized that Cotton was sincere in his beliefs, and believed that Cotton was wrong, and that’s why the founder of the Baptists believed in the separation of church and state. Williams believed that people sincerely disagree. Williams believed that freedom meant the freedom to disagree with him.

I think the notion that our always deep, rich, and entangled pluralistic political world can be put into a binary of left v. right or a continuum is like saying that all motorized vehicles are either trucks or compacts, all pets are Siamese cats or Labradoodles, all fonts are comic sans or Calibri. Taking those false binaries and making them a continuum doesn’t make them more nuanced; it just reinforces the stupidity.

So, I’m not making a claim about both sides being flawed (a claim often made by the person who watches the trolley and hopes someone else makes a decision).

I’m making this claim: our political discourse has a very consistent use of the word “freedom”. and it’s the one Cotton used: “freedom” is the ability to do whatever you think is right, and the freedom to force everyone else to behave as you think they should.

Freedom and tolerance are both claims that come from our own perspective, our own sense (our Cotton sense) that our position is the position of truth. Williams wasn’t a relativist; he believed in truth. But he tried to work toward a world of fairness, a world in which we value disagreement.

We need to stop talking about “freedom” (or “tolerance” which is similarly vexed), not because those are bad values, but because the way we’ve been using that term is so muddled and entangled with in-group favoritism that we just need to walk away from the terms for a while.

Instead, we need to talk about fairness. We’ve got a good source in that Jesus (a prophet for Muslims), and so many ethical systems say that ethical behavior means reasoning past in-group preference.

“Fairness” does not mean being equally critical of “both sides” because the wonderful world of our policy options is neither a binary nor a continuum.

We are in a world of demagoguery, a world in which every issue is falsely framed as a zero-sum contest between us and them, a world in which we are free to do what’s right or they restrict our freedom.

What that really means is that we are in a very nasty moment when “freedom” means the freedom to force everyone else to do what we know to be right. That’s what Cotton sincerely believed. That’s also what Stalin sincerely believed. That’s what a lot of people believed who turned out to be totally wrong.

Freedom shouldn’t be seen as the right to be seen as right, but the freedom for all groups to be held to the same standards to which we hold ourselves. Freedom is only freedom if it’s grounded in fairness of standards, not niceness, and not in a binary.