Tag: propaganda

You’re the propagandist!

I wander around various dark corners of the internet, and find propaganda in all sorts of places.[1] And by “propaganda,” I mean Machiavellian compliance-gaining and uni-vocal discourse.

People who choose to rely on propaganda for their political information never think that’s what they’re doing. They sincerely believe that propaganda is what those suckers believe. Effective propaganda is good at persuading people that it isn’t propaganda—that’s its first task. Propaganda in a nation or community where people can choose what they consume can’t look like propaganda, or people wouldn’t choose to consume it. We don’t think we listen to propaganda, and—and this is really interesting– even if we recognize that we do listen to propaganda, we don’t think it has worked on us.

One of the ways that propaganda looks like not propaganda is by playing to the false rational/irrational split. The rational/irrational split says that you either reason from emotion, or you reason from, um, reason.

That isn’t what the last twenty years of research in cognition shows. It shows that decision-making isn’t monocausal, and that the process isn’t a binary of any kind. How we assess an argument is influenced by perception of in-group/out-group affiliation, beliefs about those groups, our sense of commitment/threat to the in-group (a combination of feelings and beliefs), how much the issue triggers/enables motivated cognition, how aware we are of our tendency to motivated cognition, various cues and triggers in the text and environment, memory, and various other factors.  This is a good map of the processes, with conscious deliberation just h and i. The other factors are more or less unconscious (or intuitive), but that doesn’t mean they’re usefully described as emotional (they have a lot of cognitive content, and there is a logic to them) or logical.

Notice that neither the rational/irrational split, nor the false trichotomy of ethos/pathos/logos accurately describes this really complicated process. You can shove this model into the rational/irrational, or the ethos/pathos/logos, or the five parts of the mind, or the four humors, or lots of other taxonomies, but what you lose is what’s really useful about this model: the extent to which our assessments and decisions are influenced (perhaps restricted is a better word) by our pre-existing beliefs, and what we imagine our options to be.

And propaganda works by creating a very limited world of beliefs and options.

A really effective propaganda outlet is good at making its suckers believe that it is an essentially transparent medium, so that, even if we are at some point forced to acknowledge our reliance on propaganda, we underestimate how much of our world was constructed by that propaganda. We think we didn’t fall for it.

So, for instance, Tapping Hitler’s Generals is a collection of conversations that Nazi generals had while held captive in a house in Britain from 1943-45. They often talked about Nazi propaganda, with considerable contempt for the masses who fell for it. Yet they continued to believe in its central tenets(such as that the war could be won, even after the disaster of Stalingrad, see especially 44-45, 73), that the Allies would exterminate all Germans (46), that Germans were morally superior (50, 68), and they continued to support Hitler (61, 66, 73). Milton Mayer’s post-war interviews with Germans, and the interrogations of Nazi war criminals at Nuremburg show the same thing: people who know that they had spent years listening to propaganda still believed many of the lies they were told. Knowing that they listened to propaganda didn’t cause them to doubt their beliefs or judgment; they just rejected some beliefs.

And that is why propaganda is effective. Really effective propaganda doesn’t look irrational, because it looks as though it is arguing from good reasons and data. It seems true because it fits with what people already believe.

In a culture of choice, it says, they believe propaganda, but we are giving you the truth, and, even if we don’t, it’s okay because people like you have great judgment and can always recognize the truth. You are never mislead by us because you are too smart to be misled. The main move of propaganda—they are idiots, and you are too smart to fall for their propaganda—is how you get suckered.

When people ask themselves about whether their sources are propaganda, they ask all the wrong questions. They ask themselves:

  • is this source saying things that are false?
  • does this source have reasons?
  • is this source overly emotional?
  • are the claims of this source supported by experts?

Those are the wrong questions. Better questions are:

  • what are the conditions under which I would decide my beliefs are wrong?
  • if there was evidence that the major claims of this medium were wrong, would they tell me?
  • does this medium accurately represent the best counter-arguments, or does it engage in inoculation?

If we can’t answer those questions with specific instances, especially that second one, then our beliefs are probably grounded in propaganda.

So, instead of feeling good about ourselves because our propaganda outlet has persuaded us that those consumers of that propaganda are bad, perhaps we should worry about whether our sources are propaganda?

[1] I don’t find it “on both sides,” since the very notion that the complicated world of political stances can be divided into two is how the skeezy salesman of bad decisions gets his foot in the door of democratic deliberation. The first thing a skeezy salesman says to a possible mark is, “I’m not a skeezy salesman because I’m not like that guy.” There is always a “that guy” who is worse, but it doesn’t mean this guy is good. Saying that “both sides do it” is a silly thing to say—partially because the next (fallacious) step is to say “both sides are just as much at fault” which is rarely true even if there are two sides, and secondly because there are rarely two sides. “Both sides”—meaning “liberal” and “conservative”—means pretending that neo-conservatives, neo-Nazis, libertarians, paleo-conservatives, neo-liberals, and conservative evangelicals are all interchangeable in terms of their rhetoric and actions. So, Daily Sturmer and The Economist have the same rhetoric. They don’t.

Propaganda works by not looking like propaganda

You don’t get your information from propaganda. Your sources are good and objective and unbiased. You have a good and unbiased view of the overall political situation because you know what both sides think, and you’re clear that your side is more sensible.

So, let’s talk about why they are such sheeple and believe propaganda.

First, effective propaganda inoculates its viewers against criticism of the in-group, and it does so in two ways. Inoculation is the rhetorical tactic of presenting your audience with weak versions of out-group arguments—straw men, really—and persuading your audience that they shouldn’t even listen to the other side because their arguments are so bad.

Imagine that you believe that people should be able to have guns in easy access in case there are break-ins, and you can cite statistics about people who have protected their home that way. A medium opposed to gun ownership of any kind engaged in inoculation wouldn’t mention any statistics about people protecting themselves, and would say that, anyone who wants to have guns in their home for personal protection wants to take guns everywhere, including airplanes, and that would be incredibly dangerous, so it’s clearly a stupid argument. But they wouldn’t just say that—they would have a “debate” between people who want to ban all guns and some dumb jerk who says people should be able to take guns on airplanes.

So, viewers of that program would sincerely believe that they’d seen “both sides” of the debate when, actually, they’d watched propaganda. Really effective propaganda appears to present “both sides” by having stooges who argue for really dumb counter-arguments and actually confirm stereotypes about “those people.”

Second, propaganda spends a lot of time telling you how awful the other side is and (and this is the important point), saying they are so awful that you shouldn’t even look at them.

Vehement political criticism, as opposed to propaganda, spends a lot of time telling you how awful the other side is and (and this is the important point) providing links so you can see for yourself. What makes propaganda different from vehement political criticism is that propaganda says, “Rely on us for understanding what they believe” and vehement political criticism insists you read the primary material.

If you are watching media that spends a lot of time telling you how awful the other side is, and that has spokespeople who claim to represent that other side—instead of linking to the other side—you’re watching propaganda.

As Aristotle said, all things being equal, the truth will tend to emerge. And, oddly enough, one of the ways you can tell if a source is propaganda is by Aristotle’s rule—they make sure all things aren’t equal. They know that they have very fragile arguments that will crinkle up and die if exposed to the light of counter-arguments with data, and that’s why they spend so much time in inoculation. They don’t say, “Those people are idiots—go and look at what they’re saying.” They say, “Don’t go look at those sites or listen to those arguments because we will tell you what they are and they’re dumb.”

Any medium that says there is an out-group that is evil, and you should never listen to them, and doesn’t link to their arguments is propaganda.[1]

But, by refusing to link to their opposition, they’re making an admission too–that their claims can’t withstand scrutiny. Propaganda always throws around the term “objective” (it would be interesting to see whether Hitler or Stalin used that term more–it might be a dead heat). Claiming to be objective doesn’t mean you are. Having a good argument means that it can withstand argument–good arguments don’t need inoculation.

I’ve crawled around dark corners of social media, and the worst arguments in all sorts of enclaves have links to claims that support them, but never links to the opposition. They can support what they claim. Anyone can support any claim.

People think that propaganda is rhetoric that is obviously wrong and that has no evidence. But, were that propaganda, it would never work. Propaganda always has evidence and citations. What it doesn’t have is links to opposition sources; it doesn’t have fair representations of the opposition. It doesn’t make falsifiable claims.

The whole point of propaganda is not just to persuade people of your particular claims (since a lot of those claims change for political purposes), but that some media are reliable, and others are too toxic to touch. Propaganda isn’t about “believe this” as much as it is about “never listen to anyone who isn’t in-group.”

If you are relying on your source for what “they” believe, you are drinking deep at the well of propaganda. I hope that Flavor-Aid doesn’t stain your teeth.

[In case you’re wondering why I don’t have links in this post, it’s because my claim is that propaganda misrepresents the opposition and doesn’t link to them. I found, when I started making links, that I was still enforcing the notion that there are two sides, or that propaganda is an either/or rather than a continuum–that I had an opposition whom I should represent fairly. Since I really don’t want to endorse one “side” or another, as much as make a general point about argumentation, I thought that it would make more sense to strip off the links.]